I recently read a paper by George Caffentzis, titled "A Discourse on Prophetic Method: Oil Crises and Political Economy, Past and Future." It was a fascinating read,
and argued that oil prices--and consequently, the class struggles around oil production--are
intimately tied to the dynamics of capitalism as a whole. There were some gaps in logic, as well as
some obvious omissions, but for the most part the essay persuasively conveyed
the dependence of Keynesian political economy on a particular type of global
oil regime.
First, one has to understand what Keynesianism actually is--especially
through a Marxist (or at least, a semi-Marxist) analysis. Caffentzis defines Keynesianism along two
major lines:
- The recognition that labor is not simply a mindless commodity, but an autonomous entity, both "an antagonist and a motor of capitalist development." While Labor was crucial to capitalism, it could also overthrow it, and thus pacifying measures must be undertaken to prevent a repeat of the Russian Revolution on American soil.
- The perception economic growth in consumer capitalism is dependent on the increasing purchasing power of the working class. This perception manifested in a type of "compromise" between Labor and Capital, in that wages would increase proportionally with increased productivity. Thus, the State became the moderator of this deal.
It's not a bad state of affairs (compared to the usual
capitalist affair, and if one only looks at the compromise from the standpoint
of Western society). Both the workers
and the capitalists get a "guarantee" of increased income and
standard of living as long as the deal holds out.
But as Caffentzis argues, there is a hidden dependency of
energy in Keynesian political economy. Since
the compromise is built on "increased productivity, increased wages",
development must focus on automation and mechanization. This tactic, in turn, requires an
ever-increasing amount of energy--lots of it, at a relatively cheap price. And in order to guarantee this type of price
stability, there had to be some degree of control over global oil production.
Thus, from 1945 to the 1973, global oil markets were
dominated by the Western cartel of the "Seven Sisters," which consisted
primarily of US and UK multinational oil corporations. This cartel managed to keep the price of oil
at roughly $20/bbl, in 2008 dollars, for the entirety of their--and
Keynesianism's--dominance. Of course,
this price stability was largely due to the imbalance of power between the
working class of the Global South and the multinationals who exploited their
resources, as well as the support of Southern dictatorships by Western
capitalist nations. Two of the clearest
examples of this were the 1953 coup against Iran, which was attempting to
nationalize its oil resources, and the 1945 deal between Roosevelt and Kind
Saud of Saudi Arabia, which ensured US military support against any threat to
the throne (which came to fruition during the first Gulf War).
Thus, the importance of the aforementioned oil regime is
revealed. Cheap oil, extracted by the
proletariat of the Global South and sold at obscenely low prices to the
monospony of the Seven Sisters, is the foundation on which Keynesian political
economy lies.
But this relative peace in the North did not--and could
not--last. In the late '60s and early
'70s, the building reaction against the domination of Western multinationals
culminated in a wave of nationalizations of a number of oil industries in the
developing world, the creation of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC), and the 1973 oil crisis.
Suddenly, cheap oil was no longer a guarantee, and thus, neither was the
ease of increased automation.
Keynesianism promptly fell apart.
As Caffentzis writes:
OPEC presented itself as the first commodity trading organization that would realize the dreams of the International Economic Order and reverse the injustices of centuries of colonialism and imperialism. This vision, however, was translated at the other pole of the Keynesian world as a wage nightmare. Unemployment, abandoned factories, austerity budgets, welfare cuts, the prison-industrial complex, began to take shape in the recessions of the mid and late 1970s.
Thus, despite the fact that the economic crisis was a crisis
for the system as a whole, and not just the working class, the flexibility of
Capital meant that workers took the brunt of the economic trauma. Since automation was no longer a reliable
source of profit, wage repression had to once again become the primary method
of capital accumulation. Thus, the
Keynesian compromise was torn apart, as businesses consolidated as a class (via
institutions like the Chamber of Commerce), factories began getting outsourced,
and the gap in working class demand was supplemented with the expansion of the
credit markets. Out of the ashes of
Keynesianism, burned down by the revolt of the Southern nations, neo-liberalism
was born.
This re-composition of capitalism was not
restricted to the West. As Caffentzis
continues, even the silver lining that perhaps the populations with the newly
nationalized oil industries might have a
chance at self-development from the increased oil rents was destroyed--and
simultaneously re-affirmed capitalism's dominance on the world stage.
What could have meant a major crisis for capitalism, however, became a pretext for cutting the wages of workers in Western Europe and North America, while creating an investment flow (then called "petrodollars") that was used to make loans to formerly colonized countries (imposing a flexible interest rate that the sub-prime mortgage crisis was to emulate in the early twenty-first century) that in the 1980s forced them to near bankruptcy and then, under the pressure of the World Bank and IMF, to neo-liberalize their economies.
Even the most polemical anti-capitalist should be in awe at
this brilliant economic jiu-jitsu!
Of course, the most important question is why the
international working class was so easily split apart during the crisis. It is obviously difficult to blame the South
for wanting to receive a (relatively) fair share of the oil profits, especially
when rabid exploitation of their resources had happened so long, and had given
the Western nations such a leg up in terms of industrialization, development,
and standards of living. It is less
difficult to criticize these governments for succumbing to the pressure of
global capitalist institutions like the IMF and imposing austerity and
privatization on their constituents. I
have a bit more confidence in analyzing the nature of the American Left at the
time, in that there was a great deal of energy behind the reaction to the
various progressive victories of the time (notably, the Civil Rights
Movement)--enough to throw working class organizations into disarray
(especially given the economic crisis), and all the more ready to accept
right-wing tales of how the greedy Arabs ruined the economy.
I'm feeling lazy, so I'm not going to continue into
Caffentzis' analysis of the relationship between neoliberalism and oil. But there certainly seems to be a dependency,
albeit one that is even more shrouded than the relationship was during the
reign of Keynes. Despite the intense
financialization the global economy underwent during the last few decades of
neo-liberalism, there still remains a foundation on the physical economy, and
on actual production; thus, it is no surprise that the last decade of recession
and crisis corresponded with the highest oil prices in history. And since these prices will probably not drop
below $80/bbl, the crisis today has a lot of similarities with the crisis of
the '70s--as well as important differences (namely, that the crisis of the '70s
was one of stability and control, rather than permanently high price).
But regardless of the roots of the crisis, the fact remains
that there is indeed a crisis; the objective now is to ensure that the mistakes
of the '70s--when the crisis of capitalism was inverted into a crisis for the
working class--are not repeated. The
next few years could see a wave of communization and collectivization of
important economic resources--or it could see the emergence of an even more
vicious form of neo-liberalism. Only
time will tell.
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